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Introduction 
 
 I want to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify on the important issue 
that is before it today.  
 
 I am the founder and director of the University of Maryland Center for Health and 
Homeland Security (“CHHS”), as well as a professor at the University of Maryland School of 
Law.  CHHS is a university academic center with a staff of over 50 professionals that work side-
by-side with the nation‟s top federal, state, and local public health and emergency responder 
institutions, assisting them in the development of plans, strategies and policies to ensure the 
safety of our citizens in the event of man-made or natural catastrophic events.  A critical part of 
CHHS work consists of advising medical researchers developing countermeasures to 
biopathogens and highly infectious diseases on emergency operations planning, including those 
researchers at the Center for Vaccine Development at the University of Maryland of Medicine 
2  
 
and at the Middle-Atlantic Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging 
Infectious Diseases Research (“MARCE”). MARCE is a fourteen-university consortium 
focusing on research to enable rapid defenses against bioterror and emerging infectious diseases, 
including Anthrax, West Nile Virus, Smallpox, and Cryptosporidiosis. 
Summary 
 With the advent of the Anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, this Nation has been 
confronted with a serious policy conundrum. On the one hand, we have strengthened programs 
that encourage the use of our best scientific resources to develop countermeasures to the 
weaponization of highly dangerous biopathogens. On the other hand, research on those 
countermeasures requires the use of the very biopathogens we seek to defeat. There have been 
many mishaps in the handling of those pathogens, which raises the frightening prospect that the 
research may be as (or more) dangerous than the potential bioterrorist acts themselves. Indeed, 
the very Anthrax attack that motivated increased research now seems likely to have been the 
caused by research being conducted in the United States on Anthrax.  Leaving aside which 
researcher evaded security measures of the United States Army at its Ft. Detrick laboratory 
facility, the forensic evidence appears very strong that an “insider” accessed Anthrax at that 
facility to perpetrate the 2001 attacks.  
 It is the thesis of this testimony, that the Nation can upgrade security measures at those 
biosafety level (“BSL”) laboratories that handle the most dangerous pathogens (“BSL-3” and 
“BSL-4” labs), so that federal government can develop countermeasures to potential terror 
attacks without having that research in and of itself pose a threat to national security.  At the end 
of this testimony, we make recommendations in aid of such a policy. To put the 
recommendations in context, the testimony establishes the following foundational evidence: (1) a 
summary of statutory and regulatory mandates addressed to BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs; (2) a 
summary of leading reports that have been issued recommending improved biosecurity measures 
at those labs; (3) a brief description of biosafety mishaps at BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs that have 
provoked the controversy at hand; and (4) an examination of biosafety practices employed at the 
University of Maryland, Baltimore BSL-3 laboratories that deploy “best practices” for 
biosecurity.  UMB‟s measures have successfully ensured safety within those laboratories, and 
may serve as a model for the operation of non-military biosafety laboratories in the United 
States.  
 We therefore recommend that this Subcommittee draft legislation that will: (1) replace 
the present fragmented federal agency oversight system for biosafety laboratories by creating  
consolidated oversight responsibilities within a single agency; (2) through this agency, establish 
an accreditation system for BSL laboratories to ensure that they are operated safely and securely; 
(3) establish a reporting system, which ensures that all laboratory mishaps are promptly reported 
3  
 
to, and promptly reviewed by, the oversight agency so that the facts pertaining to these mishaps 
can be made available in a meaningful way to other laboratories in a “lessons learned” modality; 
(4) improve the process of personnel reliability assessments; and (5) recognize that a „one-size 
fits all‟ model of compliance is too great a burden on most non-military BSL laboratories, and 
thus foster a private sector model of strong, but appropriate and practical, biosecurity procedures 
for those BSL labs.
1
 
 
I. Background information   
The October 2001 Anthrax attacks resulted in 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax, 11 
cases of inhalational anthrax, 5 deaths and an overwhelming nationwide fear about public 
safety and the threat of biological attacks.
2
  That episode sparked an increased scientific 
effort to develop medical countermeasures that could prevent or ameliorate the dispersion 
of biological agents that would likely be used as part of a terrorist attack.
3
    
Prior to the 2001 Anthrax incident, the scientific and regulatory community 
concerns about improper handling of biological select agents used for research focused 
on possession, use and transport of those agents. However, as awareness of the highly 
dangerous threats posed by these agents emerged,  the regulatory focus shifted to: (1) 
regulating access to the most deadly agents; (2) reporting security issues at laboratories 
where research on deadly agents was conducted; and (3) developing codes of conduct for 
these laboratories.
4
 “Select Agents” were chosen by the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the Secretary of the United 
                                                          
1
 This testimony was prepared with the research and drafting help of Marita Mike, M.D., J.D. and CHHS Heath 
Director; Talley H.S. Kovacs, J.D., M.B.A. and CHHS Law & Policy Analyst; and Elizabeth Murray, Candidate for 
J.D. degree 2010 and CHHS Research Assistant.  James Jaeger, PhD, Director of Environmental Health & Safety for 
the University of Maryland Baltimore (UMB) and Melissa A. Moreland, M.S., R.B.P., C.B.S.P., S.M., Assistant 
Director and Biosafety Director for UMB, provided extensive and valuable background and guidance on biosafety 
laboratory management in general and at UMB, the latter of which guidelines and practices are referenced below as 
a potential model for private biosecurity laboratory safety. 
2
 Ronald Atlas, Biosecurity concerns: Changing the face of academic research, 12 JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL HEALTH 
AND SAFETY, at 15, 17 (2005), available at www.sciencedirect.com (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
3
 Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, The Danger Within, SCIENCE, Mar. 6, 2009 at 1283, available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/323/5919/1282  (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
4
 Caitriona McLeish & Paul Nightingale, Biosecurity, bioterrorism and the governance of science: The increasing 
convergence of science and security policy, 36 RESEARCH POLICY 1635, 1641 (2007), available at 
www.sciencedirect.com (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
4  
 
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) using criteria set out by statute. 5  The Select 
Agents identified pose high threats to human, plant and animal life because of their 
methods of transmission, potential for misuse, and toxicity.
6
  
Since 2001, funding for biodefense research has substantially increased.  In 2001 
the National Institutes of Health Biodefense Research Funding totaled $25 million, but by 
2005 had increased to $1.7 billion.
7
  Funding for biodefense work increased to $50 billion 
and was either spent by, or allocated to, other federal agencies including the Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Department of Defense (“DOD”), and the  USDA.8   
The increased funding directly correlates to an increased number of researchers and 
laboratories working with deadly biological agents.
9
  
The National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (“NSABB”), the 
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (“the Commission”) 
and the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) were independently charged with 
investigating different aspects of biosecurity at biosafety laboratories.
10
   
Exposures and incidents at laboratories such as those at Texas A&M University 
have also drawn widespread attention to the safety and security in those laboratories.
11
   
 
                                                          
5
 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 262a (2006) 
[hereinafter “PHBPA”]; See also 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), See also 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) 
(relating to animals), See also . 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants). 
6
 Id. 
7
 Atlas, supra note 2, at 16. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. at 15. 
10
Dennis Kasper, Report to the NSABB: NSABB Working Group on Personnel Reliability: Preliminary Findings and 
Recommendations, NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, December 2008, at slide 6, [hereinafter ”Kasper”] 
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/nsabb_past_meetings.html#dec2008 (follow “Personnel Reliability 
Working Group: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations” hyperlink); U.S. Gov‟t Accountability Office, 
Biosafety Laboratories: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation‟s Five BSL-4 Laboratories, (2008), 
[hereinafter “BSL-4”], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081092.pdf  (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
11
 Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas A&M University (Aug. 31, 
2007), [hereinafter Texas A&M] available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/TAMU/CDCTAMUReport.pdf (last 
accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
5  
 
II. Identified Problems  
 
Based on review of the legislation and regulations regarding BSL-3 and BSL-4 
laboratories, Select Agents;
12
 the NSABB and GAO reports;
13
 and reports of incidents and 
accidental exposures
14
 the following problems in the biosecurity and biosafety protocols 
have been identified: 
 
1. The regulatory structure for BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories is fragmented 
across several federal agencies.  
2. Incident reporting of biosafety and biosecurity incidents at BSL- 3 and 
BSL-4 laboratories is not centralized. 
3. Incident review does not produce protocol modification in a timely manner 
across all laboratories, thereby inhibiting collaboration on best practices. 
4. Physical BSL laboratory facilities do not require accreditation.     
5. Protocols that are in place to gauge personnel reliability could be improved. 
There is great interest in increasing personnel reliability within research 
laboratories, but to date, some compliance measures may be compromising 
the efficient production of social benefits gained from investigation of the 
Select Agents because of overly broad screening measures for personnel 
and a deterrent effect on potential hires. 
6. The „one-size fits all‟ model of compliance is too great a burden on most 
non-military level laboratories.  Military laboratories have heightened 
security models, but military level security is not practical for university 
campuses.  A private sector model of appropriate and practical biosecurity 
procedures for those BSL labs is needed.   
 
III. Supporting Material   
 
A. Pertinent Statutory Review: Oversight of BSL laboratories is fragmented 
across multiple agencies.  Only statues most closely related to direct BSL 
research activities are reviewed below. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 PHBPA, supra note 5.  
13
 Kasper, supra note 10; BSL-4, supra note 10. 
14
 Texas A&M, supra note 11.  
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1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996  
 
 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires 
HHS to promulgate regulations to identify biological agents that pose a potential threat to 
public health and safety and to identify protocols governing the transfer of those agents.
15
  
Under the resultant regulations, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) 
Laboratory Registration/Select Agent Transfer Program was established.
16
 
 
 The AEDPA addresses the possibility of weaponization of biological agents.
17
  
The regulations mandate that facilities safeguard these agents from individuals who might 
use them in acts of domestic or international terrorism by identifying hazardous 
biological agents and requiring registration of laboratories that transported hazardous 
biological agents.
18
 
 
2. The PATRIOT Act. 
 
 The PATRIOT Act,
19
 which was passed in October 2001, defines “Restricted 
Persons” who are statutorily ineligible for clearance from the Department of Justice 
                                                          
15
 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511, 110 Stat. 1214 [hereinafter 
Antiterrorism Act]. (After the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred E. Murrah Building in April 1995, Congress 
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in October 1996. HHS delegated authority for 
operating the Laboratory Registration and Select Agents Tracking Program, a provision of the act, to CDC. 
Regulations under the act were promulgated under 42 CFR 72.6). 
16
 See 42 C.F.R. §§ (2009) 73.1-73.21 as amended. 
17
 Antiterrorism Act, supra note 15.  
18
 Id. 
19
 Genevieve J. Knezo, Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, 
and Higher Education, Congressional Research Service Report, Apr. 8, 2002, at 19, available at 
http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:jVdHCeEo1gsJ:www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31354.pdf+critique+of+
Sec.+511+of+the+Antiterrorism+and+Effective+Death+Penalty+Act+of+1996&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&clie
nt=firefox-a (stating “Section 817 of P.L. 107-56, the PATRIOT/USA antiterrorism act expanded the government‟s 
ability to prosecute persons suspected of possessing biological agents to be used for terrorist acts, and addressed 
some of the limitations perceived in the 1996 law. The PATRIOT Act amended the biological weapons statute to 
fine or imprison (for up to 10 years) a person who “knowingly possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery 
system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, 
protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose.”) 
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(“DOJ”) to work with Select Agents.20  A Restricted Person is an individual who is: under 
indictment, or has been convicted of a felony; a fugitive; an unlawful user of a controlled 
substance; an unlawful or illegal alien; a national of a country determined to sponsor or 
support terrorism; or a person who has been dishonorably discharged from the military or 
has been committed to a mental institution.
21
  The PATRIOT Act does not provide 
exemptions from these criteria and no appeal process is in place for „restricted person‟ 
determinations. Many medical research institutions have complained that the inability to 
exempt “foreign” researchers on a case-by-case basis has dramatically impeded the 
development of medical countermeasures necessary to combat terror attacks.
22
   
 
 Section 817 of the PATRIOT Act expands the government‟s ability to prosecute 
persons suspected of possessing biological agents to be used for terrorist acts, to fine or 
imprison (for up to 10 years) of a person who “knowingly possesses any biological agent, 
toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not 
reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful 
purpose.”23 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 817, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended 18 USC § 175b (2009) [herinafter 
PATRIOT Act] (The statute defines a „restricted person‟  as  one who„„(A) is under indictment for a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year;„„(B) has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year„„(C) is a fugitive from justice;„„(D) is an unlawful user of any 
controlled substance(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802));„„(E) is an alien 
illegally or unlawfully in the United States;„„(F) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed 
to any mental institution;„„(G) is an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who is a 
national of a country as to which the Secretary of State, pursuant to section6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C.App. 2405(j)), section 620A of chapter 1 of part M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2371), or section40(d) of chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22U.S.C. 2780(d)), has made a 
determination (that remains in effect) that such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism; or „„(H) has been discharged from the Armed Services of the United States under dishonorable 
conditions.”) 
21
 Id. 
22
 McLeish & Nightingale, supra note 4 at 1641. (stating “In 2005, 40 leading scientific societies and higher 
education associations released a joint statement calling for modifications to restrictions on foreign researchers 
because the US „risk[s] irreparable damage to our competitive advantage in attracting international students, 
scholars, scientists, and engineers, and ultimately to our nations‟ global leadership.”) 
23
 PATRIOT Act, supra note 20. 
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3. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002. 
 
 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 (“PHBPA”) requires HHS to establish and regulate a list of biological agents and 
toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, it also 
expands the Select Agent regulations and imposes a registration obligation on all entities 
that possess, use, or transport Select Agents. The Select Agent regulations promulgated 
by both HHS and USDA (as required by PHBPA) are described in more detail below.  
 
4.  Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002. 
 
 The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (“ABPA”) requires the 
USDA to establish and regulate a list of biological agents that have the potential to pose a 
severe threat to animal health and safety, plant health and safety, or to the safety of 
animal or plant products.
24
 Both the PHBPA and the ABPA require the review and 
republication of the lists of Select Agents and toxins on at least a biennial basis.
25
  
  
B. Regulations and Advisory Guidelines 
 
1. Select Agent regulations 
 As directed by the PHBPA, HHS and USDA have expanded the Select Agent 
regulations to encompass possession and use of Select Agents; have requirements for 
their registration; require designation of an institutional Responsible Official; mandate 
implementation of security and safety measures to deter theft, loss, or release of Select 
Agents; require training of staff and record keeping, as well as the assessment of the 
security risk of all those who request access to the agents.
 26
  When adding a biological 
                                                          
24
 PHBPA, supra note 5. 
25
 Id; Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 647 [hereinafter ABPA]; 
(The first publication of the Select Agents Regulations 42 C.F.R. § 73, 7 C.F.R. § 331, 9 C.F.R. § 121 in the Federal 
Register occurred on March 18, 2005. The Final Rules were published in the Federal Register on March 18, 2005 
and became effective on April 18, 2005.  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published final rules in the Federal Register on October 16, 2008 that 
complete the biennial review and republication of the lists of Select Agents and toxins. The Final Rules published on 
October 16 became effective on November 17, 2008). 
26
 See also 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), See also 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) (relating to animals), 
See also 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants). The Select Agent Rules require that all entities that possess, use, 
or transport Select Agents must register with either the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the U.S. 
9  
 
agent to the Select Agent list, HHS and USDA must consider: the effect of exposure on 
human health; the degree of contagiousness; availability of treatments or immunizations; 
and any other criteria particularly addressing the potential exposure of vulnerable 
populations.
27
  If denominated as Select Agents, the biological agents must be registered 
with the National Select Agent Registry.
28
  As of the last biennial review there were 36 
Selected Agents listed by HHS, 24 by USDA and 10 overlapping agents where oversight 
authority and responsibility is shared between the two agencies.
29
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Department of Agriculture, that personnel who have access to these materials must undergo a Security Risk 
Assessment.  There are civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance with the Select Agent Rules.  
27
 PHBRA, supra note 5. (Criteria for placing an agent or toxin on the Select Agent Registry)  
28
 National Select Agent Registry, http://www.selectagents.gov/index.html (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
29
 See http://www.selectagents.gov/Select%20Agents%20and%20Toxins%20List.html ( last accessed Sept. 21, 
2009) (HHS Select Agents and toxins: Abrin, Botulinum neurotoxins, Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of 
Clostridium, Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus), Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin, Coccidioides 
posadasii/Coccidioides immitis, Conotoxins, Coxiella burnetii, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, 
Diacetoxyscirpenol, Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus, Ebola virus, Francisella tularensis, Lassa fever virus, 
Marburg virus, Monkeypox virus, Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918, pandemic influenza virus 
containing any portion of the, coding regions of all eight gene segments (Reconstructed1918 Influenza virus), Ricin, 
Rickettsia prowazekii, Rickettsia rickettsii, Saxitoxin, Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins, Shigatoxin, South 
American Haemorrhagic Fever viruses, Flexal, Guanarito, Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Staphylococcal enterotoxins, T-2 
toxin, Tetrodotoxin, Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses, Central European Tick-borne encephalitis, Far 
Eastern Tick-borne encephalitis, Kyasanur Forest disease, Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever, Russian Spring and Summer 
encephalitis, Variola major virus (Smallpox virus), Variola minor virus (Alastrim), Yersinia pestis; Overlap Select 
Agents And Toxins: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella abortus, Brucella melitensis, Brucella suis, Burkholderia mallei 
(formerly Pseudomonas mallei), Burkholderia pseudomallei (formerly Pseudomonas pseudomallei), Hendra virus, 
Nipah virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus, USDA Select Agents And Toxins, 
African horse sickness virus, African swine fever virus, Akabane virus, Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic), 
Bluetongue virus (exotic), Bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent, Camel pox virus, Classical swine fever virus, 
Ehrlichia ruminantium (Heartwater), Foot-and-mouth disease virus, Goat pox virus, Japanese encephalitis virus, 
Lumpy skin disease virus, Malignant catarrhal fever virus(Alcelaphine herpesvirus type 1), Menangle virus, 
Mycoplasma capricolum subspecies capripneumoniae (contagious caprine pleuropneumonia),Mycoplasma mycoides 
subspecies mycoides small colony (Mmm SC) (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia), Peste des petits ruminants 
virus, Rinderpest virus, Sheep pox virus, Swine vesicular disease virus, Vesicular stomatitis virus (exotic): Indiana 
subtypes VSV-IN2, VSV-IN3, Virulent Newcastle disease virus 1; USDA Plant Protection And Quarantine (Ppq) 
Select Agents And Toxins: Peronosclerospora philippinensis (Peronosclerospora sacchari), Phoma glycinicola 
(formerly Pyrenochaeta glycines), Ralstonia solanacearum race 3, biovar 2, Rathayibacter toxicus, Sclerophthora 
rayssiae var zeae, Synchytrium endobioticum, Xanthomonas oryzae, Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis 
strain). 
10  
 
There are three sets of relevant regulations: one promulgated by the CDC for the 
protection of public health
30
; and two promulgated by the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (“APHIS”) relating to animals31 and plants.32 Both sets of regulations 
establish essentially the same requirements with regard to Select Agents, including: (1) 
agents must registered and an eligible official must be assigned responsibility for them; 
(2) access to them must be restricted; (3) a security plan must be put in place; (4) a 
biocontainment and biosafety plan must be put in place; (5) experiments with them must 
be restricted; (6) an incident response plan must be put in place; (7) biocontainment and 
security training must be provided; (8) transfers of the agents must be limited; (9) proper 
records must be maintained; (10) facility inspections by  APHIS and/or CDC must be 
allowed; and (11) reports must be filed if agents are lost or stolen.
33
 
2. Security Risk Assessments  
 
 Security Risk Assessments (“SRA”) are mandated by the PHBPA, for every 
individual who seeks to work with Select Agents.
34
  Using the criteria from the PATRIOT 
Act, the SRA is intended to preempt “Restricted Persons” from gaining access to these 
potentially harmful bioagents.
35
 APHIS and CDC work with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation‟s (“FBI”), Criminal Justice Information System (“CJIS”) to identify 
individuals who should be precluded from gaining access to select agents and toxins.
36
 
The SRA most notably involves comparing an applicant‟s fingerprints against crimina l 
and terrorist databases and must be renewed every five years.
37
    
                                                          
30
 See 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), See also 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) (relating to animals), See 
also 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants). 
31
 See 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) (relating to animals). 
32
 See 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants). 
33
 See 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), See also 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) (relating to animals), See 
also  7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants). 
34
 PHBPA, supra note 5. 
35
 PATRIOT Act, supra note 20. 
36
 For a list of the steps of the process of applying for a Security Risk Assessment see 
http://www.selectagents.gov/sra.html  
37
 For a list of the steps of the process of applying for a Security Risk Assessment see 
http://www.selectagents.gov/sra.html 
11  
 
The CDC notified the NSABB that recently the FBI has begun to bi-annually 
crosscheck approved individuals against specified databases to verify that the individuals 
have not slid into a restricted category.
38
  This interim measure is crucial in maintaining a 
current accounting of all individuals involved in work with Select Agents and toxins 
given that applications for renewal are only due every five years.  However, the FBI‟s 
interim crosscheck is not presently required by law or regulation.  
 
Personnel screening processes differ between military and private sector research 
facilities.  Some military research laboratories have instituted formal Personnel 
Reliability Programs (“PRP”) –a more extensive screening process than that called for by 
SRA -- which may include a number of the following: extensive background checks, 
character references, security clearances, medical evaluations, psychological testing, drug 
and alcohol testing, polygraph examinations, credit checks and review of service or 
employment records.
39
   
 
 One reason for the marked difference between the military and non-military 
laboratories is that the PRP programs in military facilities are remnants of surety 
programs developed by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and DOD for research on 
chemical and nuclear weapons.
40
  A culture of strict security has always been the norm in 
these facilities and so the PRP are not seen as a hindrance to the recruitment and retention 
of talented scientists.  Conversely, most research on biological Select Agents is 
conducted in universities, which have a long history of openness and international 
collaboration.  To these institutions, the more onerous PRP program elements might 
fundamentally change this cultural norm and inhibit the way university-level research is 
conducted without evidence of improved reliability above that emanating from strict 
enforcement of, for example, the SRA process.
41
 
 
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”) Advisory Guidelines: Biosafety in Microbiological and 
Biomedical Laboratories, (5th ed.): 
 
 The advisory guidelines published by CDC and the NIH, Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories , (“BMBL guidelines”) delineate biosafety 
                                                          
38
 Disclosed during a Public Consultation on the Draft Report held on April 3, 2009 in Bethesda, MD.  More 
information can be found at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.html  (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).  
39
 Kasper, supra note 10, at 4. 
40
 Kasper, supra note 10, at 5. 
41
 Id.  
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and biosecurity protocols for laboratories depending on the threat posed to laboratory 
staff and scientists as well as surrounding communities.
42
   
a. Biosafety Level Designations:  
 
The BMBL guidelines delineate four biosafety levels (“BSL”) in order of 
ascending levels of containment.
43
  At each level, an appropriate containment procedure 
is prescribed with reference to specific facility safeguards, safety equipment and 
microbiological practices. BSL-3 and BSL-4 protocols require heightened oversight of 
security procedure because of the dangerous nature of the agents and toxins examined in 
those facilities.
44
  
 
1. Biosafety Level 1 is suitable for work involving well-characterized agents 
not known to consistently cause disease in immunocompetent adult humans, 
and that present minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the 
environment.
45
  
 
2. Biosafety Level 2 builds upon BSL-1 protocols. BSL-2 designation is 
suitable for labs whose work involves agents that pose moderate hazards to 
personnel and the environment.
46
 
 
3. Biosafety Level 3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, 
or production facilities where work is performed with indigenous or exotic 
agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease through 
inhalation route exposure.
47
 Examples of agents handled and stored in BSL-
                                                          
42
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, The National 
Institutes of Health, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, at 3 (5
th
 ed., U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 2007) (1984), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/.  [hereinafter  “BMBL guidelines”] 
(According to the CDC and NIH, biosafety considerations include: “infectivity, severity of disease, transmissibility, 
and the nature of the work being conducted” as well as the agent‟s origin.  These are the “primary risk criteria used 
to define the four ascending levels of containment, referred to as biosafety levels 1 through 4.”)   
43
 Id. at 17 
44
 The United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases located at Fort Detrick, MD has a 
facility housing laboratories of both biosafety levels.  Joe Pappalardo, “Virus Hunters: Inside Maryland‟s New 
Biosafety Level 4 Lab” Popular Mechanics, May 209 available at: 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/health_medicine/4315093.html?page=1 (stating: “The outer area is the 
medical research equivalent of a maximum-security prison- Biosafety Level 3.  The inner sanctum is supermax or 
BSL-4.”) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).  
45
 BMBL guidelines, supra note 34, at 41. 
46
 Id. at 44. 
47
 Id. at 49. 
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3 laboratories include: Tuberculosis and St. Louis Encephalitis virus.
48
  In 
addition to the standard microbiological practices employed in BSL-1 and 2 
laboratories, BSL-3 laboratories are encouraged to control access to the 
facility, to decontaminate all waste and laboratory clothing, to conduct all 
work with agents in a Class I or II Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC) and to 
regulate air flow in and out of laboratory.
49
 
 
4. Biosafety Level 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents 
that pose a high individual risk of life-threatening disease, that are 
contagious by aerosol transmission, or any related agents with unknown 
risks of transmission.
50
 Examples of these types of biological agents 
include: foot and mouth disease; the Ebola virus; and smallpox.  All work 
with these agents must either be conducted in a “Suit Laboratory” or a 
“Cabinet Laboratory” to protect the employees and the surrounding 
community from exposure.
51
   
 
b. Biosecurity Requirements 
  
 Biosecurity has been defined as protection of microbial agents from loss, theft, 
diversion, or intentional misuse.
52
   
 
 Apart from the Select Agent regulations, there is no current federal requirement 
for the development of a biosecurity program, as distinct from a biosafety program at any 
of the BSL-1 through BSL-4 laboratories.
53
  The Select Agent regulations require that a 
biosecurity plan exist, but they do not establish the specific components of the plan. All 
biosafety and biosecurity measures not directly related to required registration or 
                                                          
48
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, The National 
Institutes of Health, HHS Publication No. (CDC) 93-8395, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
Laboratories at 42 (3
rd
 ed., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) (1984), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl/bmbl3toc.htm   (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).  
49
 BMBL guidelines, supra note 34, at 50-56 (Biological safety cabinets provide personnel, environmental and 
product protection through air flow management and decontamination techniques). 
50
 Id. at 56. 
51
 Id. at 57. (“A Cabinet Laboratory where all handling of agents must be performed in a Class III BSC.  A Suit 
Laboratory where personnel must wear a positive pressure protective suit.”) 
52
 Id. at 118.  
53
 The Select Agent Regulations are 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) (relating 
to animals), 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants).   
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reporting in biomedical and microbiological laboratories are principally governed by the 
BMBL advisory guidelines.
54
   
 
 The BMBL guidelines recommend that facilities engage in a two-part approach to 
biosecurity considerations.
55
  First, the facility should conduct a risk assessment to 
determine if it has any agents that require biosecurity measures to prevent loss, theft, 
diversion, or intentional misuse.
56
  Secondly, the facility should conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine if the costs of additional precautions would be proportional to the 
risk of exposure to the agents used and stored in the laboratories.
57
  The guidelines 
ultimately establish ten elements that might be incorporated into a biosecurity program, 
should a facility determine that it is necessary.
58
   The BMBL guidelines are explicit in 
noting that the biosecurity program elements are not to be viewed as legally binding 
minimum standards or requirements.  
 
C. Ancillary Statutes and Regulations  
 
Multiple departments and statues are involved in oversight of Select Agents, due 
in part to fragmentation of the regulatory scheme regarding BSL laboratories, and in part 
to the scope of operations which could be involved in BSL research.  While a 
comprehensive listing and review of each applicable statute, regulation, and guideline of 
be impractical for the scope of this testimony, a few are listed below to illustrate the 
broad nature of potentially applicable law and practice. 
 
                                                          
54
 BMBL guidelines, supra note 34.   
 
55
 See, id., at 188-27. 
56
 Id. at 121 (“[T]he entire risk assessment and risk management process may be divided into five main steps, each 
of which can be further subdivided: 1) identify and prioritize biologicals and/or toxins; 2) identify and prioritize the 
adversary/threat to biological and/or toxins; 3) analyze the risk of specific security scenarios; 4) design and develop 
an overall risk management program; 5) regularly evaluate the institution‟s risk posture and 
protection objectives.”). 
57
 Id. at 120 (“Resources are not infinite. Biosecurity policies and procedures should not seek to protect against 
every conceivable risk. The risks need to be identified, prioritized and resources allocated based on that 
prioritization. Not all institutions will rank the same agent at the same risk level. Risk management methodology 
takes into consideration available institutional resources and the risk tolerance of the institution.) 
 
58
 Id. at 123-27 (The elements suggested for inclusion into a biosecurity program include: program management, 
physical security, personnel management, inventory and accountability, information security, transportation, 
accident response plans, reporting and communication procedures, training and practice drills, and security 
updates.). 
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1. NIH Guidelines For Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules 
– April 200259  
2. Hazardous Materials Regulations60  
3. International transport regulations including those of International 
Maritime Organization, and the International Maritime Dangerous 
Goods (IMDG) Code
61
  
4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction
62
 
 
D. Recent Reported Incidents of Non-Compliance At BSL Laboratories:  
 
Select events are discussed below for illustrative purposes. 
1. ANTHRAX: Fort Detrick 
 
 Bacillus anthracis (“Anthrax”), designated  alternately as a BSL-2 or 3 agent 
depending on application, was the biopathogen responsible for 5 deaths and increased 
fear regarding public safety when it was dispersed though the United States Postal 
Service (“USPS”) in 2001.63  After nearly seven years of investigation, there is 
substantial evidence that the origin of the Anthrax mailings – and possibly the perpetrator 
– emanate from the BSL laboratory at U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for 
                                                          
59
 Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Guidelines for Research Involving 
Recombinant DNA Molecules, (April 2002) [hereinafter NIH Guidelines] available at: 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines_02/NIH_Gdlines_2002prn.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).  
60
 Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§171-180 (2009) (relating to the safe and secure transportation of 
hazardous materials in commerce). 
61
 International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, January 1, 2004, available at: 
http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=158#1 (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009) (The implementation of 
the Code is mandatory in conjunction with the obligations of the members of United Nation Government under the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78)). 
62
 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, March 25, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, (Under the 
treaty, the Department of Commerce imposes export controls over certain microorganisms, toxins, biological 
equipment, and related technology to further U.S. foreign policy interests in opposing the proliferation and use of 
biological weapons.) 
63
 Atlas, supra note 2, at 17.   
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Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland (“USAMRIID”).64  Dr. Bruce Ivins, an Army 
researcher at USAMRIID, suspected in the attacks, committed suicide before officially 
being officially charged.  Because of Ivins‟ death, the government will not be able to 
present its case in court. According to Assistant Director in Charge Joseph Persichini  at 
the FBI‟s Washington Field Office, “Bruce Ivins was responsible for the death, sickness, 
and fear brought to our country by the 2001 anthrax mailings.” 65  
 
 Of note, Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, was cleared for his work with Anthrax at Fort Detrick 
through though their security process.
66
  There has been substantial debate whether Dr. 
Ivins was the perpetrator.  Irrespective of the guilt or innocence of Dr. Ivins, strong 
scientific evidence has been developed that the Anthrax strain used in the attacks came 
from the laboratory. Another lesson learned from the Anthrax attacks in October 2001 is 
that protocols to ensure the reliability of personnel can never wholly eliminate the risk of 
misuse, loss or theft of dangerous biological agents due to inherent human imperfection 
and inability to pre-screen an individual‟s intent.67   Biosecurity must therefore now be 
deemed as important as biosafety in keeping employees and the public secure in terms of 
malignant use of these agents.   
 
2. BRUCELLA: Texas A&M University 
 
 In April of 2007, the CDC reviewed Texas A & M University‟s (“Texas A & M”) 
facilities and safety protocols and found that Texas A & M was guilty of a dozen 
violations.
68
 The review was conducted in response to a notification from a source outside 
Texas A & M facilities, regarding a February 2006 occupational exposure to Brucella, a 
BSL-3 pathogen.
69
 In particular, the exposed lab worker was experienced in handling M. 
                                                          
64
 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anthrax Invesitgation: Closing a Chaper (Aug. 6, 2008), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/amerithrax080608a.html  (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009); 
Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Science Briefing on the Anthrax Investigation (Aug. 18 , 
2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/anthraxscience_081808.html (last accessed Sept. 
21, 2009). 
65
 Id. 
66
 Bhattacharjee, supra note 3, at 1283. 
67
 Kasper, supra note 10. 
68
 Texas A & M violated multiple provisions of 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2007), including §§ 73.7, 73.9, 73.10, 73.11, 73.12, 
73.15, 73.17, and 79.19.  Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating 
Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas A&M 
University (Aug. 31, 2007); Letter from John W. O‟Brien, Senior Counsel, Office of Inspector General to Eddie J. 
Davis, Interim President, Texas A&M University; Letter from Eddie J. Davis, Interim President, Texas A&M 
University to John W. O‟Brien, Senior Counsel, Office of Inspector General (Aug. 17, 2007). 
69
 The CDC conducted a site visit of Texas A & M on April 16 through 18, 2007 to review the events surrounding 
the exposure to Select Agent, Brucella, on February 9, 2006.  The exposure occurred because a laboratory worker, 
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tuberculosis (“TB”) and had been trained to work safely with that agent.   Exposure 
occurred while working with Brucella in a manner which would have proven safe with 
TB however she was not trained to work with Brucella and the safety procedures she 
applied were insufficient for this agent.
70
  Texas A & M violations included broad access 
to Select Agents by employees who were not unauthorized to work with the agents, 
multiple biosafety infarctions, and inadequate record keeping.
71
   In order to protect 
public health and safety, the Director of the CDC ordered Texas A & M to stop all work 
with Select Agents until they complied with the Select Agent regulations.
72
  In 2008, a 
settlement agreement between Texas A & M and HHS culminated in payment of $1 
million by Texas A & M. Texas A & M accepted responsibility for the lapses noted in the 
CDC investigation.
73
  
 
3. SHIGELLA: University of Texas at Austin  
 Between 2002 and 2007, as a result of inquiry from NIH, University of Texas at 
Austin (“UT-Austin”) began a systemic review of all laboratory incidents and adverse 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
who was working with Brucella, was not trained to handle the agent.  Letter from John W. O‟Brien, Senior Counsel, 
Office of Inspector General to Eddie J. Davis, Interim President, Texas A & M University (July 18, 2007). 
70
 U.S. Gov‟t Accountability Office, High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the 
Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States: Statement of Keith Rhodes (2007), at 19. 
71
 Jennifer Couzin, Texas University Responds to Biosafety Complaints, ScienceNOW Daily News, Sept. 6, 2007, 
available at http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full /2007/906/1 (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009); U.S. 
Gov‟t Accountability Office, HIGH-CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: Preliminary Observations 
on the Oversight of the Proliferation of the BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States, GAO-08-108T, 15-
20 (Washington, D.C. Oct. 4 2007); Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, 
Texas A&M University (Aug. 31, 2007). 
72
 Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas A&M University (Aug. 31, 
2007) (following a site visit by CDC representatives on June 30, 2007, the Director of the CDC extended the April 
20, 2007 cease and desist order to include all work with Select Agents and toxins at Texas A & M University until 
the problems were corrected and compliance with the Select Agent regulations was achieved); Press Release, Texas 
A&M University, Vaccine Research Update (Feb. 20, 2008) available at http://vaccineresearch.tamu.edu/news-
release.html (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009) ( Texas A&M agreed to a $1 million settlement with the Office of the 
Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). 
73
 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anthrax Invesitgation: Closing a Chaper (Aug. 6, 2008), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/amerithrax080608a.html (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009); 
Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Science Briefing on the Anthrax Investigatio n (Aug. 18, 
2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/anthraxscience_081808.html (last accessed Sept. 
21, 2009). 
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events occurring between 2000 and 2007.
74
  Thirteen laboratory incidents occurred at UT- 
Austin, including five incidents of exposure to Shigella, a BSL-2 agent.
75
  All workers 
recovered without incident.
76
  As a result, UT-Austin “undertook a thorough revision of 
laboratory policies and procedures with an emphasis on surveillance, inspection, training, 
incident reporting and incident response,” and developed and implemented additional 
safety and laboratory procedures.
77
 
4. VACCINA virus in SMALLPOX Research: Philadelphia 
 In Philadelphia, at an unnamed research institution, an immunology graduate student was 
exposed to Vaccina, a BSL-2 agent
78
 and developed an eye infection resulting in her 
hospitalization.
79
  The review of the laboratory practices revealed lax practices affording 
manifold opportunities for virus exposure, including: infrequent use of eye protection when 
working with smallpox; failure to disinfect waste pipettes prior to their removal from the 
biosafety cabinet; and removal of samples from the biosafety cabinet for experiments and use in 
other parts of the facility.
80
   
5. Foot and Mouth Disease – Pirbright, UK 
While not a US incident, this incident is an excellent example for the necessity of facility 
maintenance, so it will be covered here.   
                                                          
74
 Press Release, University of Texas at Austin, Statement Concerning Laboratory Incident Review at The 
University of Texas at Austin (Sept. 18, 2007) available at  http://www.utexas.edu/news/2007/09/18/lab/  (last 
accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. (The procedures developed by the U. Texas at Austin included training, implementing a rapid response team to 
report incidents immediately, the University‟s Institutional Biosafety Committee was given more resources to ensure 
research is done safely, and surveillance measures were upgraded). 
78
 The vaccinia virus is the "live virus" used in the smallpox vaccine.  Department of Health and Human Services: 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Fact Sheet: The Live Virus Smallpox Vaccine (2002), 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/pdf/live-virus.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
79
 Felicia Lewis, et al., Dispatch: Ocular Vaccinia Infection in Laboratory Worker, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 134 (Jan. 2006), available at  http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/pdfs/05-1126.pdf  (last accessed 
Sept. 21, 2009). 
80
 Id.  
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In 2007, livestock infected with Foot and Mouth Disease, a highly infectious BSL -4 
agent, was discovered at several local farms near Pirbright in the UK.
81
   Investigation into high 
containment labs at Pirbright found evidence of long term damage and leakage to the drainage 
system servicing the site.  The resulting exposure was suspected to have been secondary to 
contaminated waste water leaching into soil then carried off-site by vehicles via contaminated 
mud.  The event cost taxpayers over £3 billion.
82
  
E. Government Sponsored Reports: 
As a result of a one or more of the episodes described above, several investigative studies 
were undertaken to evaluate biosecurity risks. We summarize some of the major studies below.  
The reports highlighted have been selected to reflect key points that are raised in this testimony 
and are not intended to be exhaustive of the literature on the issues.  
1. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity: Enhancing 
Personnel Reliability among Individuals with Access to Select 
Agents
83
 
In the October of 2008, the White House asked the NSABB
84
 to consider whether a 
national PRP should be mandated for the nation‟s academic, government and private 
research facilities that handle Select Agents.
85
 In April 2009, NSABB produced a draft 
report recommending security improvements at non-military research facilities whose 
                                                          
81
 U.S. Gov‟t Accountability Office, High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the 
Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States: Statement of Keith Rhodes (2007), at 22-23. 
82
 Id.  
83
 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Report: Enhancing Personal Reliability Among Individuals 
with Access to Select Agents, (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter NSABB Draft Report] available at: 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/meetings/200905T/NSABB%20Final%20Report%20on%20PR%205-29-09.pdf 
(last Sept. 21, 2009). 
84
 The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity is chartered by the Department of Health and Human 
Services to “provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research, defined 
as biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public 
health and/or national security.”  NSABB advises the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the heads of all federal departments and agencies 
that conduct or support life science research.  42 U.S.C.§ 217a; The NSABB is governed by the provisions of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), which sets forth standards for the formation 
and use of advisory committees. Information about NSABB available at  
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/about_nsabb.html  (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). 
 
85
 Bhattacharjee, supra note 3, at 1283. 
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employees have access to Select Agents, but it explicitly rejected the need for 
promulgation of a formal, national PRP.
86
  The challenge before regulators, as identified 
by NSABB, is to address the risk of an “insider threat”  to BSL-4 facilities without unduly 
hindering the pace of research on biological agents that could be misused against the 
American public in a bioterrorist attack.
87
  NSABB concluded that a national PRP would 
have “unintended and detrimental consequences for the scientific enterprise that in the 
future could result in more harm to public health and safety and to national security than 
an insider threat poses.”88  
NSABB found that local institutions,
89
 meaning non-miltary institutions, have 
significantly increased security protocols under the existing select agent program; that 
there is little evidence that supports the predictive value of additional assessments of 
individuals; and that institutional leadership is often the most effective way to mitigate  
the risk of an “insider threat”.90 NSABB specifically considered the merit of requiring 
facilities to use three commonly used personnel reliability assessments: psychological 
testing, national security clearances, and medical examinations.
91
 Due to concerns over 
cost, efficacy, and deterrent effect, NSABB did not recommend adopting any of these as 
mandates for facilities doing research on Select Agents.
92
 NSABB ultimately 
recommended strengthening the SRA procedure; institutional enhancement of a culture of 
responsibility and accountability; and a reduction or stratification of the li st of Select 
Agents.
93
 
                                                          
86
 NSABB Draft Report, supra at 83. 
87
 Id. at 1. 
88
 NSABB Report, supra note 83, at v.  
89
 NIH: Office of Biotechnology Activities, Presentation: Institutional Biosafety Committees: The Linchpin of Local 
Oversight, at 2, available at: oba.od.nih.gov/oba/IBC/ASGT_2007_Training/IBCs.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 
2009).  
90
 NSABB Draft Report, supra note 83, at 8. 
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 NSABB Draft Report, supra note 83, at 9-10. 
92
Id.  
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 NSABB Draft Report, supra note 83, at 13-15.  
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2. Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 94: 
World at Risk
95
 
Congress tasked The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism (“the Commission”) to assess the Nation‟s activities, initiatives and  programs 
to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.
96
 The Commission 
focused their study on what has been perceived as the greatest threats to national security: 
biological and nuclear attacks.  With regard to biological threats, the Commission 
advanced many recommendations including conducting “a comprehensive review of the 
domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens” and tightening “government oversight 
of high–containment laboratories”.97  The Commission noted the absence of a 
comprehensive regulatory framework and found that “no single entity in the executive 
branch is responsible for overseeing and managing the risks associated with all the high-
containment (BSL-3) laboratories operated by the U.S. government, industry, or academia.”98  
3. Government Accountability Office: BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: 
Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation‟s Five BSL-4 
Laboratories
99
  
 
This GAO report specifically addressed perimeter security of the five operational BSL-4 
laboratories in its report issued in September 2008.  Perimeter security was assessed pursuant to 
15 security controls that GAO identified.
100
  GAO concluded that two of the five BSL-4 
                                                          
94
 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53,§1851, 121 Stat. 266, 
502. Through House Resolution 1, Congress established the bipartisan Commission for the Prevention of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism to address the threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction poses to the United States.  The Commission was directed to conduct an assessment of current activities 
and programs related to the threat of proliferation and to make recommendations to strengthen preventive efforts. 
95
 Bob Graham, et. al, World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism (Vintage Books: A Division of Random House, Inc. 2008). 
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 Id. at xi.  
97
 Id. at 27. 
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 Id. at 25. 
99
 U.S. Gov‟t Accountability Office, Biosafety Laboratories: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation‟s Five 
BSL-4 Laboratories, (2008), available a t http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081092.pdf  (last accessed Sept. 21, 
2009). 
100
 Id. at 14 (stating “(1) Outer/tiered perimeter boundary; (2) blast Stand-off area between lab and perimeter 
barriers; (3) barriers to prevent vehicles from approaching lab; (4) loading docks located outside the footprint of the 
main building; (5) exterior windows do not provide direct access to lab; (6) command and control center; (7) CCTV 
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laboratories had significant shortfalls in security controls that could be expected to preclude 
unauthorized access, loss or theft of select agents.
101
  HHS commented on this report noting that 
the CDC will, in coordination APHIS, seek input from relevant stakeholders about the need and 
advisability of Federal regulation regarding specific perimeter controls.
102
  
4. Government Accountability Office: HIGH CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY 
LABORATORIES: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of the 
Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States 2007
103
  
 
This GAO report addresses preliminary observations on the oversight of high 
containment laboratories.  The report identifies lessons learned from past exposure events and 
specifically raises the issue that no single federal agency has the mission and therefore, is 
accountable for all BSL labs.
104
  The GAO concludes that reporting barriers must be overcome in 
order to enhance biosafety though shared learning from past mistakes and to assure the public 
that accidents are examined and contained.
105
  This report also emphasizes the critical 
importance of facility maintenance in preventing environmental exposure and contamination as 
clearly demonstrated in the Pirbright exposure.
106
  
 
F. University of Maryland, Baltimore: A Laboratory Biosecurity Model 
While there are many examples of biosecurity failures with regard to BSL 
laboratories, many private institutions have established model procedures to assure that 
mishaps are prevented. I have had the good fortune to work closely with laboratory 
researchers on our own campus, the University of Maryland Baltimore (“UMB”), where 
successful protocols have been put in place that meet and exceed federal requirements.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
monitored by the command and control center; (8) active intrusion detection system integrated with CCTV; (9) 
camera coverage for all exterior lab building entrances; (10) perimeter lighting of the complex; (11) visible armed 
guard presence at all public entrances to lab; (12) roving armed guard patrols of perimeter; (13) X-ray magnetometer 
machines in operation at building entrances; (14) vehicle screening; and (15) visitor screening.    
101
 Id. 
 
102
 Id. at 19. 
103
 U.S. Gov‟t Accountability Office, High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the 
Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States: Statement of Keith Rhodes (2007), at 19. 
104
 Id. at 7.  
105
 Id. at 7-8.  
106
 Id. at 8.  
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UMB is one of thirteen schools in the University of Maryland System.  The 
campus is comprised of professional and graduate schools including: Medicine, 
Pharmacy, Dentistry, Nursing, Law, and Social Work. There are approximately 6000 
students and 5000 staff and faculty.  In the fiscal year 2008, UMB was awarded over 
$450 million in grants for research conducted in its 1500 laboratories.  Among these 
laboratories are a BSL-3 suite with numerous laboratories and multiple animal BSL-3 
laboratories.  UMB has used the 5
th
 edition of the Biosafety in Microbiological and 
Biomedical Laboratories (“BMBL”) manual (described above) to draft its own BSL-3 
Safety Manual. This manual is designed to protect researchers from contamination by the 
biological agents used in the laboratory, as well as protect the campus at large from 
accidental exposures to those agents. 
1. UMB Biosecurity Measures: 
 The UMB, Department of Environmental Health and Safety recognized the need to 
develop a comprehensive, interactive course to cover issues of laboratory safety operations 
training for BSL-3 laboratories.
107
  The UMB laboratories employ strict measures to protect the 
employees, staff, and surrounding community from exposure to the select agents and toxins used 
in its research laboratories.  In fifteen years, the UMB has not experienced an instance or attempt 
of theft of select agents or hazardous materials or a loss or release from a UMB facility.
108
   
The CDC and APHIS Select Agent regulations require that the facilities maintain a 
security plan that establishes policy and procedures to ensure the security of areas 
containing select agents and toxins.
109
 Every facility working on Select Agents within 
UMB conducts an annual security risk assessment, event-based assessments, employs key 
card and/or security guard challenges at every entrance, and maintains secure file storage 
for all research documentation.
110
  As recommended by the BMBL guidelines, UMB has a 
comprehensive approach to security planning including: annual personnel training 
accompanied by tests to demonstrate understanding; annual tests of the security, 
biosafety, and incident response plans; physical security including at least three distinct 
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levels of physical barriers; accountability of leadership for vigilant oversight of security 
protocols; unannounced audits of records and access logs; escorts for non-SRA UMB 
staff, i.e., maintenance and housekeeping staff; strict intra-University and external 
transport guidelines; annual reviews; and drills and exercises.
111
  
Additionally, UMB has a certified biosafety professional as their biosafety officer.
112
  
This additional level of training is not mandated of the biosafety officer; however the 
UMB has chosen to have this additional credentialed professional as the biosafety officer 
for the team. 
IV. Recommendations   
 
1. PROBLEM: The regulatory structure for BSL level 3 and 4 laboratories is 
fragmented across several federal agencies.  
 
 Recommendation: The PHBPA and the ABPA grant oversight for select agents 
to the HHS and USDA respectively.
113
  Additionally agents, which overlap the 
human, animal, and plant categories because of their potential to impact each species, 
can be registered with either agency.
114
  Recombinant DNA research is additionally 
covered by NIH guidelines.
115
 Depending on the nature of the action, multiple other 
agencies and regulations may also be involved. 
 
 One federal agency should provide oversight for laboratories handling BSL-3 and 
BSL- 4 labs.  The CDC and APHIS are tasked with similar oversight responsibilities 
under the PHBPA; however, it is apparent that the CDC may be in a better position to 
enforce the Select Agent regulations as primary regulator.  In recent testimony to 
Congress by the Inspector General of the USDA, it was reported that APHIS still had 
not ensured that entities were fully complying with regulations regarding security 
plans; restricting access to select agents; training individuals authorized to possess, 
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use, or transfer the agents; and maintaining current and accurate inventories.”116  The 
CDC appears to have a more developed Select Agent enforcement program evidenced 
by thirteen enforcement suits brought between 2004 and 2009.
117
  
 
2. PROBLEM: Incident reporting of biosafety and biosecurity incidents at BSL-3 
and BSL-4 laboratories is not centralized. 
 
 Recommendation: Again, oversight for select agents is assigned to the 
HHS and USDA respectively.
118
  Additionally agents that overlap categories 
can be registered with either agency.
119
  Incident reporting for BSL-3 non-
Select Agents is not required, though laboratories such as those at UMB do 
track incidents regarding Non-select agents internally. 
 
 One federal agency, charged with oversight, should receive all reports of 
incidents of loss, theft, or misuse regarding BSL-3 and 4 labs, regardless of 
whether a Select or non-select Agent is involved.   
 
3. PROBLEM: Incident review does not produce protocol modification in a 
timely manner across all laboratories, thereby inhibiting collaboration on best 
practices. 
 
 Recommendation:  Incidents should be reported promptly to one 
centralized agency for BSL-3 and 4 laboratories.  Reports should be regularly 
reviewed on a timely basis.  The review should not be punitive in nature and 
should be geared towards improving security and safety across labs.  The 
review should be expeditiously shared with all BSL-3 and 4 institutions, so that 
investigators working with these agents can learn from each other and share 
solutions in an organized manner.   
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4. PROBLEM: Physical BSL laboratory facilities do not require accreditation.     
 
  Recommendation:  Each laboratory is subject to inspection and site visits 
to assess compliance with the Select Agent regulations.
120
  Surprisingly, 
facilities no not require accreditation.  The Pirbright incident demonstrated 
that beyond initial design and construction, ongoing facility maintenance plays 
a critical role in ensuring the safety and security of high exposure labs over 
time.
121
 This is critical to preventing environmental exposure and disease 
spread.  Each laboratory facility should be accredited to assure uniform 
standards for biosafety and biosecurity across institutions. Accreditation should 
require periodic review and assessment. 
 
5. PROBLEM: Protocols that are in place to gauge personnel reliability can be 
improved.  There is great interest in increasing personnel reliabili ty within 
research laboratories, but to date, some compliance measures may be 
compromising the efficient production of social benefits gained from 
investigation of the Select Agents because of overly broad screening measures 
for personnel and a deterrent effect on potential hires. 
 
  Recommendation:  
 
1. There is an interest in increasing personnel reliability. There is 
also reluctance to compromise research efficiency and place 
additional budgetary strain on BSL research laboratories.   
Practical improvements to improve personnel reliability should 
be implemented, including:   
 
- Improve the SRA to achieve more stringent screening while 
not imposing the onerous process of a formal PRP.  This 
improvement is aligned with the recommendations of the 
NSABB.
122
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- The informal practice of checking the names of individuals 
with favorable SRAs against the Counterterrorism Watchlist 
and other databases by the FBI that is now occurring about 
every six months should be formally incorporated into the 
SRA process. 
  
-  All responses, whether affirmative or negative, to questions 
asking about past criminal conduct, substance abuse and 
mental illness should precipitate further inquiry through 
character references or discussion with the prospective 
employee.   
 
2. The NSABB also identified optimal personnel characteristics that 
should be considered for candidates for employment in high 
containment labs.
123
  Research on the reliability and practicality 
of assessing for these characteristics should be undertaken and 
the accreditation process should be adapted to the results of that 
research. 
 
6. PROBLEM: The „one-size fits all‟ model of compliance is too great a burden 
on most non-military level laboratories.  Military laboratories have heightened 
security models, but military level security is not practical for university 
campuses.  A private sector model of appropriate and practical biosecuri ty 
procedures for those BSL laboratories is needed.   
 
  Recommendations: 
 
1. Military institutions have fully developed security models in 
place that are not practical for the private sector.  A non-military 
model is needed for BSL-3 and 4 biosecurity.  An ideal model of 
this sort would take into account the need for integrating 
biosecurity measures with the open educational nature of 
university campuses. 
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- The UMB has demonstrated that their system is practical and 
provides security and safety without compromising the 
quality of research produced.  
 
- A model, such as that at UMB, would take into account 
compliance with the BMBL guidelines and provide a standard 
against which developing programs could achieve 
compliance.   Additionally, UMB employs a certified 
biosafety professional as their biosafety officer.  We believe 
this additional lever of biosafety training should be required 
at BSL-3 and 4 laboratories.  
 
- Research is needed to assess what additional steps may be 
needed to secure private sector BSL-4 laboratories, which are 
few in number.
124
  
 
- The GAO perimeter report assessed BSL-4 labs based on 
perimeter security parameters alone.  Fifteen parameters were 
chosen based on „GAO experience‟.125  Research is necessary 
to validate the GAO‟s perimeter security parameters.  
Additional security parameters should also be assessed and 
their implementation benefit weighed against additional 
expense.  Validated measures for improving BSL security will 
help in the development of future security model 
development. 
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